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ABSTMCT

Multinational corporations (MNC) have recently
been pushed to the forefront of the analyses of world
economic development. This study attempts to provide
a sketch of the future role of multinational corpora
tions in the development process of host countries
by synthesizing existing views of MNC activity. The
various schools of thought are discussed and a step
towards a systematic reconciliation of theoretical
differences is attempted. Finally, the impact of
multinational corporations on Turkey's development proc
ess is considered with specific attention paid to the
issues of balance of payments, taxes, transfer of tech
nology and employment.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades the multinational corp

oration (MNC), a major force in the economic world, has

been pushed to the forefront of the analyses of world
economic development.

This attention to the roles of the

MNC was generated from the concerns expressed by developing
countries in their attempts to implement social, political

and economic transformations.

Broadly speaking, those

critical of MNCs accuse them of hindering the development of
local economies through the advancement of inappropriate
production and constmiption patterns, and of interference in

domestic affairs.

On the other hand, proponents of MNCs

assert that foreign direct investment (FDI) via the multi

national corporation benefits the host countries by provid
ing the tools to develop their economies and raise the

standard of living.

Above all it represents the path of

salvation for the development of Third World economies

which are lacking in capital and/or expertise.
In support of these opposing views, several concep
tual frameworks of analyses have been forwarded.

In addi

tion to the classical, the most widely held frameworks include:
Neo-Marxist, Neo-Mercantilist, Sovereignty-at-Bay,

and Global Reach approaches. Briefly, while th^ NeoGlassical model sees the multinational corporations as a
means of enhancing world welfare, the Neo-Marxists view

MNCs as benefiting the parent company to the detriment of
the host country.

The Sovereignty-at-Bay model views MNCs

as potential contributors to the home and host country, and
as independent of the home state.

The Neo-Mercantilists

posit that MNCs have a positive impact on the home country
and a beneficial impact on the host country.

MNCs are viewed as responsive to US interests.

In addition,

Finally,

the Global Reach school holds that MNCs are a detriment to

global welfare as they are merely concerned with their
selfish interests.

This study is the result of the dissatis'faction

with the application of any one approach to a particular
country.

The above mentioned approaches are far too general

to be accurately applied across the board.

They tend to

overlook a country's specific needs as well as its singular
cultural and historical values.

To consider the impact of

multinational corporations as either beneficial or detri

mental to a country, from a holistic point of view, appears
to be a simplification of a complex and dynamic issue.

This

study is an attempt to provide a sketch of the potential
role of multinational corporations in the development
process by using an analysis which consists of a synthesis

of the above mentioned approaches.

It provides an analyt

ical framework within which lesser developed countries

(LDCs) relations with MNCs can be analyzed in relation to
recent developments in international financial markets.

This study will also look at the impact that MNCs

have had on the economic development of Turkey, as well as
their future role in that country,

Turkey was chosen for

the case study as its new economic policies are encouraging
foreign investments.

In the past, Turkey had shown a

certain coolness towards FDI.

In this respect Turkey rep

resents a valuable country for the analysis of MNC-LDC
relations.

Objectives and Methodology

The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to de
velop an eclectic synthesis of the various models which
attempt to examine the impact of multinational corpo
rations on host countries; and (2) to use the Turkish case

to examine the past and potential role that MNCs have

played in the Turkish economy.

Such issues as balance of

payments, government revenue, employment, and transfer of

technology will be analyzed.

Growth and development

statistics along with a review of the current literature
will be examined in this attempt.
The Plan of Future Chapters

In addition to this chapter, five subsequent

chapters will be presented.

The second chapter will provide

the review of literature on the various models of analyses
6f multinational corporations.

The third chapter will

present the objectives, the methodology, as well as the

limitations intrinsic to this study.

The fourth chapter

will consist of an alternative approach to the analysis of
multinational corporations, and will be followed by a survey

on the impact of foreign direct investment on the develop
ment of Turkey, which comprises the fifth chapter.

The

sixth chapter will consist of the stimmary and the con

clusions of this study.

Chapter 2
A REVIEW OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES
TO THE ANALYSIS OF MNCs

This chapter presents a brief review of the

literature on the various approaches to the analysis of
multinational corporations.

Since much has already been

written on the various models, the review is merely in
tended to familiarize the reader with the main charac

teristics expounded by the various schools, and does not

contend to present a complete presentation of the schools.
The Neo-Classical School

Despite the apprehensions expressed by host states
with regard to the multinational corporations, the neo
classical school holds that the continued attempts on the

part of the host states to attract foreign direct invest
ment through various incentive packages, such as prefer
ential tax legislations, suggests that the benefits of
FDI outweigh the negative effects that may arise.

Ac

cording to this school, multinational corporations are

an asset to the host country's quest for economic develop
ment by providing scarce capital, technological and mana

gerial skills,employment, and by aiding the baLance of

payments.

In addition, the orientation of the multi-^

national corporation towards efficiency and cost reduc

tion adds to its potential as an effective agent of

development.^
It is generally held that developing countries often
lack the necessary capital for the development of key in

dustries.

According to Blake and Walters "One of the more

important benefits of multinational corporations for host
countries is the mobilization and productive use of in

vestment capital.^
Traditional theorists generally tend to point to

a direct correlation between the flow of private foreign
investment and the economic progress of post World War II
Western Europe.

The recent successes of Third World

countries such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea are also
3

used as supports to this argument.

This point is illus-

See for instance, Melville J. Ulmer, "Multi

national Corporations and Third World Development", Journal
of Economic Issues 14, no. 2 (June 1980); Nasrollah S.
Fatemi, Gail W. Williams, and Tribaut de Saint-Phalle,

Multinational Corporations;

Problems and Prospects, 2nd ed.

(London: S. Barnes & Co., 1976) "

~

^David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics
of Global Economic Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1976), p. 98; Ulmer estimates that U.S. direct investment in

the less developed countries at the end of 1978 neared $40
billion, and further estimated that it was growing by about
15 percent per annum.
'3

See for instance. Jack N. Behrman, National Interests

and the Multinational Enterprises (New Je rsey: PrenticeHall, 1970), pp. 14-16; Ulmer (1980); Grant Reuber, Private
Foreign Investment in Development (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973), p.

trated by the following chart;
Table 1.

Growth rate and U.S. Direct Investment in
57 Third World Countries.

Countries

Annual Average Change
in CNP/capita 1960
1976 (in percent)

U.S. Direct In-

vestment per cap

ita, 31 Dec. 1976

Top one-third

4.57

$45.78

Second Third

2.22

13.97

Lowest third

.22

3.36

Source: Ulmer p.459. Per capita rates of growth are
taken from 1978 World Bank Atlas (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank 1979); U.S. direct investment
figures are from U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
As can be seen, this table seems to uphold the Neo
classical position.

There does appear to be a correlation

between the amount of foreign investment and increases in
the growth rate of the Cross National Product (CNP).

For

instance, those countries that have received an average of

$45.78 per capita in foreign investment have experienced
an average growth rate in the CNP of 4.57 percent.

The

question that remains unanswered, however, is whether it
is the influx of FDI which has generated the higher growths,
or whether greater amounts of foreign investments were
attracted by existing high growth rates.

As such, a simple

comparison of FDI/capita and per capita growth rates, remain

far from conelusive.
Another area in which the MNC is seen as

con

tributing factor to economic development involves
transfer of technology and managerial skills,

the

Through

the

multinational corporation, the LDCs are able to enjoy the

technology developed by the investing countries,

In add

ition, the managerial skills that accompany foreign direct
investment increase the efficiency and reduce excessive

waste.

Furthermore, the multinational corporatio:n

ops and trains the management of host countries

devel

This is

done by sending the potential managers for training to an

affiliate or to the parent company.^
The Neo-Classical school further holds th t the

host country is attracted to the multinational ec rpora

tions because of the employment that is generated by foreign
investment.

Not only does it directly employ part

of the

vast labor force, but it also creates jobs in re]ated

in

dustries by increasing the demand for goods suppl ied by
local enterprises.

Traditional theorists hold tb at

the

MNCs impace on employment has most likely been c uite
substantial from the standpoint of the areas in w hich

located.

it is

That is, Itt^Cs have proven to be more responsive to

host government incentives to locate in economlca lly de

^Behrman (1970) p.18.

pressed areas than the local corporations.
Another attractive aspect of foreign direct invest
tnent is the favorable effect that MNCs have on the host

country's balance of payment accounts.

Their contributions

to the balance of pajravent are seen as brought about by the
promotion of exports, and by the local productior of previ
ously imported goods.

Studies have shown that foreign sub

sidiaries have proven to be more effective in exp orting
their products, especially manufactured goods, than

their

domestic counterparts,^
The view that Neo-Glassical theorists generally
have towards MNCs is best summarized in the writings

of

Fairleight S, Dickinson Jr,:

The multinational corporations have definitely
contributed to world welfare. They have been
partly responsible for the rebuilding of warravaged Europe and the development of resources
of many developing nations, Their ability to
tap financial, physical, and human resources
all over the world, their capacity to develop
new technology and skills, and their managerial
supremacy to translate resources into specific

outputs have proven to be outstending.7
In essence then, what this school advances is that a

free and open economy and the pursuit of self-interest in

5see Reuber (1973) pp.167-177; Behrman (1970)
pp.19-20.

^Blakd and Walters (1976) p.99,
7Fatemi, et.al, (1976) p.13 in the introduction by
Dickinson Jr.

10

a competitive economy will have long run benefits through
the efficient utilization of resources.

The Neo-Marxist Approach

This approach finds its roots in the writings of

Marx, Hilferding, Lenin, and Liixemburg.^ This school
stresses two points.

First, based on the Marxian theory

that the falling rate of profit will prove to be the nemesis
of the capitalist system, this approach sees the expan
sionary policies of the capitalist state as necessary for
its survival.

Second, and closely related to the first, is

the view that the survival is accomplished at the expense of
the Third World.^

This school holds that the state is an agent of the

multinational corporations, and that the MNCs generate and
maintain patterns of inequality and dependency between
countries.

By this argument the U.S. national interest is

seen as synonymous with that of American business groups.
In support of this argument, radical scholars often

SRudolph Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital (1910); V.I.
Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (N.Y.

International Publications, 1939); Rosa Luxemburg, The
Accumulation of Capital (London: Routledge, 1951).

^For a discussion on this see Griffin "Underdevel
opment in History" and Andre Gunder Frank "The Develop
ment of Underdevelopment". Both articles are in Charles
Wilber, ed., The Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopment (Random House. 1979).
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point to the April 27, 1898 speech by Indiana's senator
J. Beveridge in which he states:
American factories are making more than the
American people can use. American soil is
producing more than they can consume. Fate

has written our policy for us; the trade of
the world must and shall be ours.

And we

shall get it as our mother, England, has told

us how.

We will establish trading posts through

out the world as distributing posts for
, American products.

We will cover the ocean

with our merchant marine.

We will build a

navy to the measures of our greatness. Great
colonies, governing themselves, flying our
flag and trading with us, will grow about our
posts of trade. Our institutions will follow

our trade on the wings of our commerce.10
Accepting as axiomatic the penetration of foreign

markets by big firms, the analysis of MNCs focuses on their

effects on local economies.

Basically, advocates of this

approach see the underdevelopment of the Third World as an
epiphenomenon of the exploitative nature of the developed
capitalist world.

The Neo-Marxists reject the claim of

corporate apologists and traditional theorists that foreign

investment benefits the host country as it provides capital,

technology, employment, and helps the balance of payments.
This school argues that rather than providing capital, multi'
national corporations avail themselves of local capital.

Felix Greene, The Enemy, Notes on Imperialism and

Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970 reprint ed,,
Philippines: Malaya Books Inc.), p.100. For further
interest see William A, William "The Large Corporation
and American Foreign Policy" in D. Horowitz, ed. Corp
oratiohs and the Cold War (1969), p.74.

12

For instance, 0'Connor has found overwhelming evidence

that "one-half of American and Foreign Power Company's
million post war expansion program...was financed from local
savings.

The claim that MNCs help the local economy and the
balance of pajnnent accounts is also refuted by the Neo-

Marxists who point to the repatriation of the majority of

the profits which were generated by local savings.

In his

studies, Evans has found that during the period 1950-1965
MNCs' remittances from Latin America "Exceeded net new

private investment by $7,5 billion,
In addition to the repatriated profits, many LDCs

complain that the flight of capital is further increased by
the over-pricing of intermediate goods from the parent

company as well as by the over-charging for dated technology.
The Neo-Marxists also negate the claim that foreign invest

ment creates employment on the basis that MNCs tend to use
capital intensive technology.

This issue is further compounded by the fact that

hopeful laborers flood the industrial centers, from the

lljames 0'Connor,"The Meaning of Economic Imperi
alism", eds. Fann and Hodges, Readings in II,S , Imperi
alism (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1971)

12peter Evans, "National Autonomy and Economic Devel
opment: A Critical Perspective on Multinational Corpora
tions in Poor Countries" International Organization 25
(1971): 678.
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agricultural setting, hoping to find employment.

This

influx of laborers creates slums and increases the level

of unemployment and ixnderemployment—thereby increasing the
reserve army of laborers and depressing wages.

On a greater scale, one of the main concerns of
radical scholars is the domination of a less developed

country's economy by the MNC: this is seen as reinforcing
the dependence of the LDC on the developed countries.
According to Sunkel, foreign firms in Latin America have
come to dominate the main sectors of private economic

activity causing a basic change in the social structure and
in the political system of those countries.

On the same

issue Furtado points out:

The process of forming a local entrepreneur
ial class has been interrupted. The best
talents that emerge from local industries

are being absorbed into the new managerial
class...National independent entrepreneur

ship is...restricted to secondary activities
or to pioneering ventures which in the long
run, simply open up new fields for the future
expansion of the multinational corporation,..
The elimination of the national entrepreneur

ial class necessarily excludes the possibility
of self-sustained national development, along
the lines of the classical capitalist
development.
While Neo-Classical scholars hold that the Third

130swalso Sunkel, "Big Business and Dependencia" in
G. ,Modelski ed., Transnational Corporations and World
Order (1979),p.223.

l^Ibid., p.222 as quoted by Sunkel.
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World is underdeveloped because of lacking capital and
technological expertise, radical schola|rs such as Griffin
■

i

posit that underdevelopment is a product of the historical
i

process of expansionism of the colonical powers,
An additional problem of foreign investment that
'

•i

radical scholars point to is the creatipn of a dual eco
■

nomy in the host country.

■

I■

That is, while the center of the

host state may prosper, the country as |a whole does not
benefit proportionally,

.
i
One of the leading scholars, Raul

Prebish, argues that the capitalist nations and the elites
■j '

of the host country have formed an alliance geared towards

promoting consumer capitalism in the periphery,16
Neo-Mercantilism

:
'j

Like the Neo-Marxist approach, the Neo-Mercant

ilists dismiss the impact of pluralist politics in ana
i

lyzing the pursuit of national policies.

In contrast to

the Neo-Marxists, this school considers the nation-state,
I

rather than the capitalist class, as the unitary actor in

l^Griffin in Wilber (1979), p.78. !
■

.

j

16For discussions on uneven development see Andre
Gunder Frank in Wilber (1979); Samir Amin, Accumulation

on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory^f Under
development (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Johan
Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" in G. Modelski

(1979); Raul Prebish, "A Critique of Peripheral Capitalism"
CEPAL Review (First Semester, 1976). |

15
■

j

the role of policy making.

.

.

In their view, the expan

sionary policies of American businesses can only be under
stood by an analysis of the international political order.

That is, multinational corporations are used by the U.S.
govemment in the quest of bringing host countries within

their sphere of influence in an era of competition with the
Soviet Union.

The national strength vis-a-vis other states

is seen as the ultimate goal of policy makers, with economic

consideration occupying secondary concerns.

This view is

clearly stated by Gilpin:
/

.

■

■

...every economic system rests on a particular
political order, its nature cannot be under
stood aside from politics...The multinational
corporation has prospered because it has been

dependent on the power of, and been consistent
with the political interests of the United
States.17

Accordingly then,the MNC is a transnational actor for the
mere reason that it mirrors the perceived interests of the

United States.

For instance, this school would argue that

the United States encouraged the overseas expansion of
extractive industries, for example, as a result of the

existing fear, voiced by Clark Clifford and James Forrestal,

that the United States was running out of raw materials.

Consequently, it follows that foreign investors will prove
to be more responsive to the needs and interests of the

17Robert Gi1pin, U.S. Power and the Multinational
Corporation (Basic Books, 1975), pp.40-41.

~
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home country.

Unlike the Meo-Marxists, the Neo-Mer

cantilists tend to concentrate their research on data

gathered from the developed states, namely Japan, West
Germany, France, and Great Britain, rather than on the
relationships that exist between multinational corpora
tions and less developed countries.

This school is heavily influenced by world politics

as well as by Neo-Classical economics.

As stated by

Petras: "The politics of international development is
approached as the resolution of conflicts of interest among

national public policies,"18
Sovereignty-at-Bay

This school advances a transnational political

economy.

It posits that the nation-state is gradually

decreasing in importance as the interdependence in the world

economy increases.19

As such, the nation-state can no longer

remain the sole focus of analysis and room must be made to
incorporate transnational actors, such as multinational

corporations in the overall analysis,

By this approach, the

ISjames Petras and Kent Trachte, "Liberal, Struc
tural, and Radical Approaches to Political Economy: An
Assessment and an Alternative" in James Petras ed., Crit
itcal Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the

Third World (N.Y,: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p.18,

19see Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty-at-Bay (N.Y.:
Basic Books, 1971).

~
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multinational corporations are no longer seen as agents of
the nation-state or the capitalist class of its home country,
but rather as independent entities in the pursuit of their

self-interests.

According to the Sovereignty-at-lay school

the increased competition faced by MNCs, has compelled them
to become anational and apolitical in the pursuit of their
corporate interests.

Vernon also forwards that the increase

in new enterprises emerging to challenge the established
MNCs, will increase the bargaining power of the host states.

The forsaking of home country interests and the
increase in competition will lead, according to this school,
towards maximizing global welfare.

This approach does not,

however, claim that the development of global welfare will
take place without any conflict, but rather will be a dia

lectic between several forces.

Namely, the quest of host

government to increase their control over the domestic

economy; the increase in competition; and the MNCs pursuit

of profits.

In regard to the domestic disparities advo

cated by the Neo-Marxist theorists to be the result of
foreign investment, Vernon states;
Nonetheless, a study that focuses on the multi
national enterprise proves a poor vehicle for
analyzing these fundamental issues. Multi
national enterprises are neither the necessary
nor the sufficient condition for the existence

of the problems that are proving so deeply
troublesome in the industrializing process,
Hegemony,

corruption, inequity, pollution,

and indifference to consumer interests were

endemic long before the multinational enter

18

prise existed.20
Global Reach

This approach was developed by Richard Bamet and

Ronald Muller.^l While it concurs with the Sovereignty-atBay approach in that multinational corporations are becom

ing anational entities, it disagrees with the approach that
MNCs are capable of promoting global welfare.

Rather, Bamet

and Muller argue that MNCs operate to the detriment of both
home and host countries.

The authors accuse the multi

national corporation of creating unemployment in both the

LDCs and the home countries and of depleting host conntry
resources without just compensation.

In short, it can be

seen that this approach is very critical of the functions of
foreign direct investment.

According to Bamet and Muller

multinational corporations "act as disturbers of the peace

on a global scale,"22
Summary and Conclusions

As can be seen by the literature review, there exists

20Raymond Vemon, "The Multinational Enterprise as
ol" Worldview (May 1977): 42,

^^Richard Bamet and Ronald Muller, Clobal Reach
.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1974),

22lbid., p,367.

19

a vast array on the conclusions on the impact of multi
national corporations.

While the Neo-Marxist and the Global

Reach schools concur that multinational corporations are a
detriment to host countries, the Neo-Classical and the Neo-

Mercantilist schools view the MNCs as benefiting the host
country.

The Neo-Mercantilists, however, view the host

state's benefits as a factor of the home country's interests.
The Sovereignty-at-Bay school holds that MNCs have, overall,

a beneficial effect on both the home and host countries.23
Generally speaking there are two major limitations
intrinsic to the various approaches.

The first stems from

the selection of data, which appears to be chosen on the
basis that it supports the original contentions.

This in

turn raises serious questions regarding the objectivity of

the studies.

The second limitation concerns the general

ization of conclusions on the impact of the MNCs.

That is,

the studies tend to view all MNCs as similar and fail to

analyze their impact according to their various industries,
or according to the specific needs and circumstances sur
rounding the individual host countries.

The alternative approach, detailed in the sub
sequent chapter, is an attempt to overcome these limita
tions.

It also considers the impact that recent trends,

23see Appendix A for a table summarizing the various
schools.

^

2.0

namely inter-MNC competition, will have on LDC-MNC re
lations.

This alternative approach relies heavily on the

Sovereignty-at-Bay school while simultaneously drawing from
the other schools in the attempt to provide an eclectic
approach to the analysis of MNCs.

Chapter 3

THE IMPACT OF I4tJCs ON DEVELOPMENT:

AN ALTERI^ATIVE APPROACH

Objective and Methodology

The Objective

As suggested in the introduction, this study exa
mines the impact of MNCs on development in general, and on
the recent development efforts of Turkey specifically.
The Hypotheses.
eses.

This study is rooted in two hypoth

First, that multinational corporations are promoters

of development, and as such are agents of development.
Second, that any single approach is not applicable to all
MNC-LDC relationships.
The Methodology

The impact of multinational corporations on host
countries is examined with respect to such issues as the

balance of payments, the transfer of technology, levels of
employment, and host government revenues from IlNCs.

The

analysis of these issues will, for the most part, be the
oretical.

The concern is to show whether multinational

corporations can be beneficial to the development of the
host countries in general, and of Turkey in particular.

This will be accomplished by examining the relevant growth
and development statistics and through a review of current
literature.

The development of this alternative approach requires
several restrictive assumptions.

1.

They are:

As this study is mainly concerned with the impact

of MNCs on host countries it is important to isolate their
role, therefore, it has proven necessary to base this ap
proach on the assumption that the host governments have the

best interest of their constituency, and hence the country
in mind.

Though radical scholars would argue that the deci

sion made by local governments are partially produced by the
income distributions, which in turn, are a function of the

MNCs and the capitalist economy, this level of analysis

remains out of the breadth of this study.

The question then,

with which this study deals is whether a host country whose

government is committed to development can effectively use
the MNC as a means of enhancing this goal.

2.

This approach is based on the premise that for

eign direct investment need not be, and in fact is not a

zero sum game.

The mere fact that an agreement is reached

between the host country and the MNC, suggests that all
parties involved perceived their projected benefits as
outweighing their estimated costs.

3.

This approach also concurs with the Sovereignty

at-Bay and Global Reach approaches, in that multinational
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GorpGrations are becoming anatlonal entities in their

quests to increase profits and/or power.

The recent

competition between MNCs has brought about the necessity
for corporate loyalty to overcome national loyalty.
4.

This approach is rooted in the premise that

economic growth is a necessary, but not a sufficient pre

requisite for economic development.^
5.

In this study the multinational enterprises are

viewed merely as a tool to aiding host governments in their

quests for economic development.

As such, they are not the

solution, but simply a potentially important piece to the

puzzle of development.

Their basic role in this approach is

to promote economic growth of the host country through the

use of appropriate technology and more efficient use of time
and input materials.

In light of this premise the MNC

cannot be held solely responsible for the failure of eco
nomic development, nor can they, by the same token, receive
all the credit if and when the goal is met.

Rather, it is

the responsibility of the host government to assure the
transformation of growth into development.

iThe difference being that economic growth rep
resents a quantitative improvement (GNP/capita), whereas
economic development implies a qualitative improvement in
the standard of living (education, health, income dis
tribution, etc.).

Also see, Adelman and Morris, Economic

Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford
Press, 1973); W. Steward and P. Streeten, "New Strategies

for Development: Poverty, Income Distribution and Growth"
in Wilber (1979).
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Some Limitations of Ttig Study

The analysis of the impact of multinational corp

orations requires in-depth examinations on a wide range of
issues; namely economic, social, and political.

Due to time

and space limitations, each of these factors can only be
incorporated in the overall analysis, rather than be indepen
dently developed.

Ideally, a comprehensive study of MNCs should be

directed towards providing policy implications with regards

to promoting or discouraging MNC involvement in Third World
development plans.

Since the study in question is mainly

concerned with an analysis of the MNC * s role in development,
it is limited to general policy implications.
Furthermore, it must be noted that one of the prob

lems in the analysis on the impact of multinational corp
orations on a host country is the amount of speculation

required when comparing the costs and benefits of MNCs to
some other alternative--namely, that which would have taken

place in the absence of foreign direct investment.

In this

respect, analyses are, at best, very difficult to quantify
and remain in most cases merely theoretical.

Despite the above mentioned limitations, the pro

posed approach is justified in that is is a step towards a
systematic reconciliation of the theoretical issues ex
pounded by the various schools.
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In what follows, the methodology suggested in this

chapter will be developed and applied to an analysis of
the impact of MNCs on development.

Chapter 4

QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT
AND THE ROLE OF MIJCs

The purpose of this chapter is to' develop an eclectic
synthesis of the above mentioned approaches, while taking
into account the recent trends in international economic
relations.

MNCs as a Source of Development Finance

It appears that the general concensus among the less
developed countries, though less prevalent today, is that

the process of industrialization would lead to the develop

ment of the economy.1 Eager to develop, many LDCs imple
mented the process of industrialization in total disregard

of traditional economic, social, and cultural values.^ All
^It could be argued that the five stages leading to
economic growth, as forwarded by Walt W. Rostow, became the
guideline for many LDG: RostowVs schema was a historical
desGription of the stages that the West, specifically Eng
land, had experienced on their way to development. For an^
in-depth description of Rostow's five stages see W.W. Rostow,
ed., The Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth^
(London: Macmi11an, 1964). Rostow first developed his
schema in 1956 in the Economic Journal, 66 (March 1956),

2see Alberto Martinelli, "The Political and Social
Impact of Transnational Corporations" in Harry Makler ed.,
The New International Economy (Beverly Hills: Sage Pub
lications, 19S'Zy.
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efforts were geared towards the achievement of economic
growth.

Though many countries experienced an increase in

growth (GNP/capita), economic development remained question
able.

The causes for the failure of development are many
and complex.

Though there are certain barriers that can be

singled out as prevalent, a generalization is nearly impossi
ble as the extent of their impact varies according to the

countries' particular characteristics.
of these barriers need to be mentioned.

Nevertheless, some
One of the more

common problems associated with the development of Third

World countries

is the attempt to impatiently transform an

agricultural society into an industrial one.
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the

source of development finance.

The three main sources of

capital are domestic savings, foreign aid, and foreign

direct investment via multinational corporations.

The importance of domestic savings as a source of
finance is a contested issue.

That is, while the Neo

classical school argues that the underdevelopment of the

capital market, along with the high marginal propensity to
consume (MPG) endemic to Third World countries, fail to

generate enough capital for domestic savings to be

considered a viable source of development finance.

On

the other hand, the Neo-Marxists point to their studies
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indicating that MNCs finance a majority of their operations
from local savings.

It must be pointed out, however, that while local
savings are able to finance some ventures,their ability to

finance the overall development of the country is unlikely.
Furthermore, the primitiveness of the capital market of
most LDCs limits the transfer of capital.

As such, it must

be concluded that local savings is incapable of financing
development.

Following World War II, foreign aid was seen as a

means of providing the much needed capital to LDCs.

Ac

cording to the Pearson Commission, however, it appears that
the flow of aid to the less developed countries is likely

to decline in the future.^ In light of this, one could
then suggest that foreign investment via the multinational
corporation is bound to become more important to the LDCs'
overall economic plan.

As such, a clearer understanding,

and hopefully an objective interpretation of the MNC is of
the essence.

The Role of MNCs

Speaking in the broadest of terms, there appears to
be three major sources of conflict stemming from the exis

^See Harry G. Johnson, "The Multinational Corporation
as a Development Agent", Columbia Journal of World Business
5 (1970);25-30.
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tenee and actions of MNCs in less developed countries.
First, the multinational corporation is a foreign entity
that behaves in an unusual or wrong fashion.

Second, the

international mobility of the MNC enables them to take

advantage of the host cotintry's juridical boundaries.

Third,

the MNC is often viewed as a vehicle for the exertion of the

parent state's interests."^
Recent attempts by international agencies, such as

the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), to work out codes of

conduct for multinational corporations on a wide range of
issues, underlines the relevance of the economic, social,

and political impacts of MNCs.^
Thus, to categorically suggest that MNCs are either

beneficial or detrimental to a host state is a simplifica
tion of a complex issue.

In addition to looking at coun

tries independently, it is necessary to look at multi

national corporations individually.

That is, the multi

national corporation's effect on the LDC will vary given
its orientation (extractive, manufacturing, service or

^Blake and Walters (1976) p.97.

5One must, however, question the ability of such
supranational bodies to enforce any measures.

It appears,

based on the historical record, that the abidance to such

guidelines as might be forwarded would merely be on a
cooperative and voluntary basis, thereby reducing the
efficacy of such international regulatory commissions.
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banking),

This is one of the major weaknesses in the

analyses of multinational corporatious,

As stated previ'

ously, the various schools tend to view all MNCs in the same
light, and there is no attempt to differentiate among HNCs,
Viewing the matter from this perspective, it seems
evident that the< impact of multinational corporations on
host countries will vary in accordance to its orientation.

For example, it is generally held that the impact of
manufacturing, service, and banking MNCs tends to be viewed
as more beneficial to the local economy, than the extractive

industries, as they have a direct stake in the growth of the

economy.^ While many scholars are opposed to manufacturing
enterprises on the basis that the goods produced are geared
towards the constimption patterns of the rich and, as such,
are not conducive towards the development of the local
economy as a whole, it can be argued that this is an inter
nal weakness on the part of the host country and the MNC
should, therefore, not take the brunt of the accusation.

To clarify this point, the term 'internal weakness' needs to
be elaborated.

Given the fact that the local governments

must approve the entry of any type of foreign direct invest

ment, the burden of selecting that enterprise which will
most benefit the economy rests on its shoulders.

i

The ques

^In contrast, extractive industries are viewed as less

concerned with the growth of the host country's economy as
the product is merely extracted and sold outside the local
economy. For further interest, see Evans (1971).
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tion of selectivity, then, is clearly the role of the ruling
bureaucracy.

Clearly, the process of selection cannot be

left to the multinational corporation.which operates on
sound business terms and would not turn its entry right down
on the basis that its product might not be commensurate with
the host country's development plan.

In this study, the

1

multinational corporations are viewed merely as a tool to

aiding host governments in their quests for economic develop
ment.

Therefore, they are not the solution, but simply a

potentially important piece to the puzzle of development.
The process of selection must also take into account

the prospective benefits offered by rival MNCs.

a country's ability to be selective was minimal.

In the past

The major

ity of the MNCs were U.S. based and competition between MNCs
was relatively low.

In the present era, however, the

scenario has changed.

There has been an increase in Euro

pean, Japanese, and Third World multinational corporations

emerging to challenge the established MNCs.^ This increase
in MNCs clearly adds to the bargaining power and selec
tivity of the host country.

Gilpin writes:

..,the emergence of new centers of economic

7See David A. Heenan and Warren J, Keegan, "The Rise
of Third World Multinationals",The Atlantic Community Quart

erly (Spring 1979); Raj^ond Vernon (1977). For a recent
survey on the increase of Third World financial institutions
in specific, see the Economist, November 21-27 1981 "A
Survey of Banking in the Middle East",
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power in the so-called underdeveloped world
(The Arabs, Iran, Brazil, etc.) challenge
the political and economic framework which
has benefited the American multinationals.
The diminution of what has been a Pax Ame

ricana and the rise of powers hostile to
the global activities of American multi
national corporations threaten these MITCs'
reign over intemation economic relations.°
In the earlier phase, LDC's quest for industriali
zation resulted in a competition among each other to attract

foreign investment through investment incentives such as tax

breaks.

Today, as the competition between MNCs over market

shares increases, it should translate into added benefits

for the host country.

According to John Hein, Director of

International Economics at the Conference Board, during the

period 1971-1979 the U.S. share of the 500 largest indus

trial firms declined from 280 to 219.^

David Heenan and

Warren Keegan also predict continued "Third World corporate
intrusions into the domestic markets of even the most
established multinationals.

From the above arguments, one could conclude that a
host government which is responsive to its political
constituency could use, the multinational corporations as a

viable means toward the development of that country.

The

^Robert Gilpin, "The Political Economy of the Multi
national Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives", The
American Political Science Review 70 (1976): 190.

^Los Angeles Times, 8 April 1981.
iOHeenan and Keegan (1979) p.120.
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new found power of selectivity of the government will better
allow a host government to set the conditions of foreign
investment which are commensurate to its economic develop
ment.

The Impact of MNCs

Some of the impact in MNC-LDC relationships which
has been criticized by various schools consists of such
issues as the balance of payments, the transfer of tech
nology, levels of employment, and taxes.

This section will

examine the role of MNCs on the basis of these issues and

will review some of the steps that countries have taken to
offset the undesirable impacts of foreign direct investment.
Balance of Payments

MNC critics hold that multinationals generally tend

to contribute to a deficit in the balance of payments
accounts by taking more international currency out of the
country than they bring in.

As evidenced by Evans, the

repatriated profits to U.S. parent companies during the

period 1950-1965 exceeded net new private investment by $7.5
billion.

According to Blake and Walters, income from U.S.

direct investment was $10.4 billion, while the outflow of

capital from the United States amounted to $3.4 billion.

l^Blake and Walters (1976) p.95.
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Though at first glance such figures seem to indicate
the negative impact of MNCs on the balance of payments, they
may be somewhat misleading when the balance of payments ac
count is looked at as a whole.

On this issue Frank argues

that these flows are "logically unrelated" as the investment
of a given year cannot be compared to the outflow of the

same year since profits are related to prior investments.12
However, when one looks at these flows over a span of fif

teen years, as has Evans, they become to a certain extent

related as they represent the investments of prior years
and the outflow of capital during the same period.

As such,

these flows must have an impact on the host country's
balance of payments account--the degree of which, however,
remains speculative.
Frank's contention that these flows Cannot be the

only criterion used in the comparison is justifiable.

In

addition to capital flight, such factor as the levels of
imports and exports need also be taken into account.

In

looking at the levels of exports, it is argued that the

subsidiaries of MNCs are more effective in exporting their
products than the domestic firms.

This is usually accom

plished by the MNC by increasing the levels of productivity
and efficiency whether through capital accumulation, the

12Isaiah Frank, Foreign Enterprises in Developihg
Countries, (Ba11imore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980),
p.30.

35

upgrading of tlie labor force or through scale and agglomer
ation effects.

The reduced costs allow

the product to be

more competitive on a global scale and therefore better

suited for export.

Furthermore, the MNCs' access to the

world market through

links allows a greater volume of

exports than would otherwise have been possible.

In add

ition, when one considers the fact that in some cases l®lCs

expand overseas in order to circumvent regional trade barri
ers, they clearly contribute to the host country's foreign
exchange through exports.

Another way MNCs can add to a host country's balance
of payments is by locally producing goods that were previ
ously imported, thereby lessening the strain on the coun
try's foreign exchange reserves.

It could, of course, be

argued that local entrepreneurs could undertake the task of
producing import substitutes rather than the foreign sub
sidiaries.

In many cases this does occur.

In other cases,

the economies of scale and the lack of teehnological exper
tise prove to be massive barriers to such undertakings.

In

such events it might be advantageous to locally produce the
product, via the MNC, rather than importing it.

One of the problems with the strategy of import sub
stitution, however, as pointed out by Vernon, is that

l^Vernon (1971) p.176.
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generally the decision to produce locally is based on
the availability of local inputs and the existence of a
domestic market alone, rather than taking the costs of

production into account.

The upshot of Vernon's argiiment

is that the decision to implement the strategy of import

substitution is not a simple one and should not be rooted in

the urge to industrialize.

Such factors as the market,
r

costs, employment, availability of resources, and compara
tive advantage should be carefully scrutinized before any
decision is rendered.

MNC critics charge that the balance of payments ac

count is also ill-effected by the over-pricing of inter

mediary goods and technology during parent-subsidiary trans
actions.

According to Evans, this could prove "to be an

even more important source of extra returns from manufactur

ing investment in less developed countries.

It must be

pointed out, in all fairness, that the charges that the

parent companies overcharge in the transfer of intermediate

goods and technology does not universally hold true.^^ The
reasons for the various practices will be left to a later

l^Evans (1971) p.679.
l5See Behrman (1970) p.21, A survey of sixty four MNGs
in Australia points to various practices ranging from con
siderable overpricing to pronounced underpricing. Though
Australia is not an LDC it constitutes one of the few stud

ies which deal specifically with transfer of technology and
intermediate goods.
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point in the chapter, when the issue of taxes is discussed.
Resentment generated by MNC profit repatriation on
the amounts of repatriated profits by MNGs is accentuated by

the ^act that they generally tend to avail themselves of
local savings rather than importing the much needed capital.
The LDCs point to the fact that not only do MNCs repatriate
a great share of the profits to the parent company, but that
the profits were generated by local savings, thereby pre

senting a double blow to the country's quest for development.

Muller estimates that during the period 1965-1970, 78 per
cent of the capital used by MNCs was locally financed.
The impact of the balance of payments on the overall
development is far from conclusive.

For instance, radical

scholars have found it difficult to support the contention

that the appropriated portion of the surplus is significant
enough to prevent the development process in LDCs.

This

does not in any way imply, however, that the issue has not
warranted the attention it has received.

Though it may not

be a sufficient factor" in preventing the development of the
LDCs, it is an important contributing aspect in the process
of economic development.

The diametrically opposed conclusions of the various

schools on the issue of balance of pa5mients suggests that

16see Ronald Muller, "The Multinational Corporation
and the Underdevelopment of the Third World", in Wilber ed.,
(1979), p.163.
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a generalization is nearly impossible, and it is therefore
necessary to analyze each case independently.
Transfer of Technology

One of the attractive aspects of foreign direct in
vestment to host countries are the benefits received from

the transfer of technology.

This is apparent in the recent

decision of the government of Turkey (GOT) to begin actively

seeking new investments by foreign firms, after having a
history of hostility towards foreign investors.

Similarly,

India and China are also presently seeking foreign invest

ment, though exclusively in the domain of high technology.
The main alternatives to the MNCs, as a mean of

technology transfers, is its purchase through licensing, or

its production.

The latter option is usually waived due to

the high costs involved in the research and development of

the technology, as well as the shortage of scientists in
many LDCs.

Though licensing is an alternative that is used,

it is not always possible.

The licensors tend to be selec

tive in the licensing of technology for fear of losing

control over the innovation, and decline many applications.

In this light, it appears that the main route for the trans
fer of technology rests with foreign direct investment.
As in most of the literature on the impact of multi

national corporations, conflicting views emerge on this
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issue as well.

l^Thile orthodox scholars see MNCs as agents

for the diffusion of technology to LDCs, radical scholars
view the MNCs as the cause of, rather than the solution, to

the existing technology gap,

They argue that MNCs hinder

the development of the host state's technological capabil
ities by attracting local scientists and researchers through
higher wages and better facilities.

Consequently this re

sults in the perpetuation of the dependency of host states
on the advanced countries for the transfer of technology.

Multinational corporations are also accused of overcharging
for technology which, LDCs claim, is often dated.
In addition to the economic aspect, the transfer of

technology has far reaching social and political dimensions.
X-Jhile many countries have raised tariffs and barriers to
foster the development of industries, there are only a few

cases where such restrictions apply to the transfer of tech
nology.

Rather, there is an implicit assumption that tech

nology is merely a good that can be bought, sold and uti
lized as any other product, regardless of the contexts to

which it is applied.

That is, technology which is deve1

oped according to the needs of a specific society is often
ill-suited and inappropriate to the conditions prevalent in

the importing country.17
Though there are explicit similarities between the

17Martinelli in Makler (1982) p.108.
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goals of the multinational corporations and the LDCs-

such as effective use of resources and increased produc
tivity--it is important that a distinction between the

importation of a specific technology and its implementation
be made.

According to Fatemi, failure to do so will result

in a "sociological backlash against technology and modern

ization in general."18
The main issue revolves around the introduction of

appropriate technology to the LDCs.

A prototype of appro

priate technology was the movement in the 1950s, which urged

the tranfer to LDCs of machinery that had become obsolete
by Western standards, and less capital intensive than the
new machinery.

The problem with this approach, however, is

the general assumption that the LDCs are simply behind the
developed world, and what was once beneficial to the devel

oped countries is presently suitable to the LDCs.

This view

completely ignores the cultural and historical values par

ticular to the LDCs.

According to Cardoso, the technology

implemented by mderdeveloped countries must constitute a
blend rather than a purely imitative model of the indus
trialized countries.19

losrow Fatemi, "Multinational Corporations, Devel
oping Countries, and Transfer of Technology: A Cultural
Perspective" Unpublished paper. (Middle Tennessee State
University, March 1981).

^^Femando Cardoso, "Development Under Fire" in Makler
ed., (1982)
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As introduction of the latest technology may not
benefit the LDC as a whole, it appears that a blend between
modem and traditional technology would be more appropriate.
It seems evident that the decision to introduce technology
cannot solely be based on economic and technical issues, but
rather must consider the cultural, historical, social and

political dimensions of himan existence.
The issue is indeed a difficult one to resolve.

Without the transfer of technology via the MNC, can the LDGs

afford the Ixaxury of waiting for the development of indige
nous technological innovations?

The recent decisions of

Turkey, India, and China to open their borders to foreign
direct investment seem to suggest that the task of develop

ing technology is a formidable one requiring more time than
permissible.
Hence, the solution appears to be based on the

transfer of technology within a controlled environment.
Though such international bodies as UNCTAD and OECD are

advancing codes of conduct for the transfer of technology,
the ultimate responsibility of assuring the transfer of

adequate technology rests in the hands of the host govern
ment.

Closely related to the issue of technology is the

question of employment.

It is on this aspect of MNC-LDC

relations that this study will now focus.
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Employment

Radical scholars argue that the implementation of

capital intensive means of production results in a higher
level of unemployment.

The question then is how to recon

cile the need for technology with the levels of unemploy
ment that it generates: Since unemployment cannot be elim

inated lest there is a drastic change in the modes of pro

duction, and since this does not appear to be the case, at
least within the foreseeable future, it is essential to find

a compromise that will result in minimizing the social costs
of technology.

Once again the multinational corporation has emerged
as a focal point in this analysis,

Bamet and Muller hold

that MNCs create unemployment on a global scale.

Other

charges stem from the accusations that MNCs attract a vast

pool of laborers from the traditional setting and are there
by able to keep the wages and the organization of labor
unions in check.

At this point it is needed to speculate on what would
have occured in the absence of llNCs.

In the event that

multinational corporations were not permitted entry, and the
local entrepreneurs undertook the task of industrialization,

would the current situation be drastically altered?
likelihood it would not.

In all

Though the local entrepreneurs

20see Sunkel in Modelski ed., (1979) pp.222-223,
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would not have access to the latest technology, they would
still utilize the most modern technology which they could
get licensed for.

As such, their impact on the level of

unemployment would, arguably, not be that marked.

Though

MNGs hire what appears to be a sizeable number of laborers,

the figure is not that impressive when taken as a percent of

the total labor force.

By the same token, it appears un

likely that the local industrialists would increase the

figure by any meaningful manner.

Furthermore, studies have

shown that MNCs prove to be more responsive to local govern
ment incentives to locate in economically depressed re
gions.

In order to increase their benefits from foreign

direct investment, many countries are, among other measures,
establishing requirements about the number and nature of
positions that the multinational corporation must reserve

for local employees and managers.

In addition, as a means

of controlling the level of unemployment some countries are
requiring that MI^Cs pay sizeable indemnity payments to those
laid off--regardless of the reasons.

This latter measure

usually takes place in more developed countries, however.
The lack of a strong labor movement in most LDCs makes this
approach less likely and less probable.

21see Behrman (1970) pp.19-20.
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Taxes

Host governments are often attracted to foreign
direct investment by the taxes that will be remitted'.

This

holds especially true in areas in which the economies of
scale and technological expertise prevent local entrepre
neurs from developing such industries.

For instance, Blake

and Walters write that in 1970 the major oil companies re

mitted $8,420 billion to members of the Organization of
22

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the form of taxes.

Though the sums of taxes appear substantial, it is argued
that they are far less than what they should be.

Radical

scholars have pointed out that MNCs have adopted extra

legal means of reducing such payments.

One of the mora

common methods involves the over-pricing of intermediate
goods to the subsidiary in order to reduce the profits, and
hence the taxes.

Depending on the tax legislations, MNCs

also underprice goods being transerred to subsidiaries.

If

taxes in the manufacturing country, for instance, are higher

than those of the importing country, it is advantageous to
under value the goods.

23

The result of this type of trans

action reduces the foreign exchange revenues of the host
country along with the tax revenues

^^Blake and Walters (1976) p.100

^^Barnet and Muller (1974) p. 157
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Another technique implemented by MNCs is what Bamet
and Muller termed "(the) modem version of the 18th century

'triangular trade

By this method, the MNCs make use

of tax havens (such as the Bahamas) by shipping underpriced

exports and overpriced imports to tax free ports, from where
the goods are later reexported at regular market price, or
higher, to subsidiaries in other countries.

The attempts

of host governments to collect the due taxes are frustrated
by the limited ability of its internal revenue services to

deal with the highly sophisticated accountants and the
complicated corporate structures of multinational corp
orations.

On the issue of multinational corporations the late

President of the AFL-CI0, George Meany, while testifying
before the Subcommittee on Intemational Trade of the

Committee on Finance, United States Senate, stated:

The multinational firms can juggle their
bookkeeping and their prices and their
taxes. Their export and import transac
tions are within the corporation, deter

mined by the executives of the corporation.
This is not foreign trade.

Surely it is

not foreign competition.25
It must be kept in mind, however, that the quest to

reduce taxable income is not limited to foreign investors

24ibid. p.158.

^^Hearing before the Subcommittee on International
Trade of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate. 93d Cong.,
1st sess., 27, 28, 29 February; 1, 6 March 1973, p.397.
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alone.

Local enterprises also seek to avoid taxes.

Though

they do not have the abilities of MNCs as far as intrasubsidiary transactions are concerned, they behave in a
rather similar fashion by sending undeclared profits to
foreign banks.

As all governments are aware, the que'St

to avoid taxes is universal indeed.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it appears that the impact of
multinational corporations is complicated and controversial.

A generalization of their impact detracts from an objective
interpretation of the role of an MNC,

This is not to say,

however, that all MNCs are beneficial to a host country's
economic development plan.

The increase in MNC competition

should, however, allow the host governments to be more se
lective in their choice of MNCs.

Furthermore, the LDCs

have gathered years of experience in their dealings with the
MNCs and have adopted policies in order to increase their
overall benefits from foreign direct investment, without

substantially detracting from the profit potential of the
MNC.

Some of these policies have been implemented on a

single country basis, while others have been complimented by
regional efforts to control the impact of the multinational
corporations.

A case in point would be the Andean Common

Market in which the members have agreed on a set of string
ent rules.

Blake and Walters have provided a brief look at
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some of these measures which appear instructive:

First, foreigp investment is prohibited in
a number of industries, including banking,

insurance, broadcasting, publishing, and
internal trahsportation. Second, new invest
ments and most existing investments must

divest itself of majority ownership (the
fade-out formula) within 15 years in Chile,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela and within

20 years in Bolivia and Ecuador, so that
national investors participation will be
at least 51 percent. Third, annual earn

ings repatriated by foreign subsidiary
firms cannot exceed 14 percent of the
investment.

Fourth, a foreign subsidiary

may not pay its parent company or other
affiliate for the use of intangible tech

nology know-how; in addition, clauses or
practices that tend to restrict competition
or production or otherwise increase the
cost of the technology to the host state

are prohibited.26
The example of the Andean Common Market could very
well be the stepping stone for other countries that desire

foreign direct investment, but on their ovm terms and
commensurate with their specific needs.

The inter-MNC

competition will most likely be the factor which controls
the enforcibility of such measures,

The threat of being

replaced by a competitor will force the MNCs to adapt to
the provisions--as decreed.

A crucial element in the development of an economy

is the strategy implemented by the local government,

As we

have seen the process of industrialization has not been
tantamount to development, and has left many leaders disap

^^Blake and Waltera (1976) p.123.
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pointed and forced to reevaluate their strategy, and at
times alter it for one that is more inline with that coun

try's particular needs and characteristics.

It must be

remembered that multinational corporations are merely a tool

for the host governments' economic development plans.
The next chapter will focus on the impact of multi

national corporations on Turkey's economic development plans,
It will attempt to identify the potential role of MNCs in

that country, as well as look into the steps implemented by
the GOT to assure maximvim benefits from foreign direct in
vestment.

ter 5

THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

ON TURKEY'S DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

This chapter analyzes the effects that multina
tional corporations have had on Turkey's development

efforts by utilizing the procedure explained in Chapter 3.
First, a historical background examining the role of MNCs
as a source of development finance will be provided.

This

will be followed by a critical analysis of the impact of

MNCs on Turkey's developfflent.

Third, recent policies will

be reviewed in view of their relevance to foreign capital,

and finally future prospects will be briefly outlined,
Turkey's Experience With Foreign Capital

In 1980, Turkey reevaluated its economic policies
and determined that fundamental changes were necessary if it

were to integrate in the world market, and improve the
domestic situation.

As Ebiri observed, the new outward-

oriented policies presented by the Demirel Administration

on January 24, 1^80 were attempted not because of their
preference to the traditional strategy of etatism, but rath

er because the latter was no longer feasible.^ For example,
the strikes that plagued Turkey's industries and the rise

^Kutlay Ebiri, "Turkish Apertura", METU Studies
in Development (3/4) (Ankara 1980):209-254.
B for chronology of events.

See Appendix
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in the price of oil made it very difficult and costly for
the country to continue its inward policy of import sub
stitution.2

The January 1980 economic reforms consisted of a
fundamental policy change.

The reforms called for the

development of an outward oriented economy, as well as for
an increased role to market forces.

Briefly, the reforms

consisted of four points; (1) a more accurate rate of ex-

change--the Turkish Lira (T.L.) was devalued by 33 percent
vis-a-vis the dollar; (2) a tighter monetary policy and the

freeing of interest rates; (3) added incentives to promote

exports; and (4) a drift from the policy of etatism.^ In
addition, administrative regulations concerning imports and

exports were simplified, and a basic attitude change toward
foreign investment was called for.
In the past, applications for foreign investment
were shuffled between the state planning office, the minis

tries of commerce, industry, and finance, resulting in

nearly a two year span before any decisions were reached,
which usually tended to be negative.

Partly as a result of

this bureaucracy foreign investors shied away from Turkey

2The Economist estimates that 7.7 million man-days
had been lost in the first 9 months of 1980 as a result of
strikes. 9/12-18/81, p.9.

)iri (1980) p.210.
freed on July 1, 1980.

Also the interest rates were
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(domestic and economic instabilities also caused foreign

investors to turn away from Turkey).

Under the new economic

policy's attempts to attract foreign businesses, the deci
sion making for FBI has been centralized within the State
Planning Organization (SPG) presently headed by a close
associate of Mr. Ozal, Mr. Yildirim Akturk, who is also a
strong advocate of foreign investment.

Turkey's recent economic policy is arguably the
result of the dialectical process of Turkey's past econom

ic policies.

Briefly, in the first twenty five years of

the Turkish Republic, the main goal of the government was

self-sufficiency.

This led to a certain coolness toward

foreign capital, placing emphasis both on state run enter

prises (SEEs) and on the building of an infrastructure.

Though Turkey preferred a capitalist oriented economy, the
lack of a strong private sector and the shortage of capital

prevented its implementaion.

Consequently, Turkey devel

oped a new model which consisted of an amalgamation of the
perceived respective advantages of capitalism and social
ism--a mixed economy.

The basic idea of the mixed economy

was for the private and state sectors to work together in
advancing Turkey's economy.
the shortage of capital proved, however, a massive
barrier.

The acceptance of foreign aid, as a means to

overcome this barrier

following World War II constituted a

■
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basic theoretical shift in the approach to etatism.'^
Spurred by huge amounts of foreign assistance Turkey experi
enced growth, and a strong private sector began to emerge.

During the 1950's, the uncoordinated policies of the Mend
eres regime along with the high debts incurred by accepting
foreign aid, the inefficiency of the SEEs, the politically

controlled prices, and the increased public demands for
goods and services led to shortages and severe inflation.
The faulting economic situation prompted acute deflationary
and stablization measures, which in turn germinated polit
ical dissention and led to the overthrow of the Menderes

regime and his Democratic Party in 1960.5
In 1960, the creation of the State Planning Orga

nization (SPG) marked the implementation of economic plan

ning.

The five year plans (they are now in the fourth)

were an attempt to better organize Turkey's quest for devel

opment.5
The record reflects that during the period 1950

1980, Turkey experienced an average annual growth rate of
around 6.5 percent.

Real growth, however, was reduced by

^See Z.Y. Hershlag. Turkey: The Challenge of Grov7th,
2d ed., Leiden: E.J. Brill (Netherlands, 1968).

~

^See Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy
1959-1975.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1977) for an account of
the political factors which contributed to the overthrow.

^See Appendix C for a table on the Macroeconomic
goals of the five year plans.

■■■
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an annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent.7

During

the same period Turkey has experienced two major inter

ruptions in its growth; the first occured between 1958-1961
as a result of the Menderes Administration's inflationary

policies, and the second began in 1977, of which Turkey is
presently attempting a recovery.

In 1977, Turkey had a

trade deficit of $3.4 billion, inflation X\?as at a record

high and unemployment at an unprecedented 25 percent.
The economic reform

introduced by the Demirel

Administration, arid later implemented by. the military

government was geared to overcoming the barriers to Turkey's
economic development.

The Impact of Foreign investment
oil The Turkish Economy

As a result of the strong sense of nationalism

and the distrust of foreigners, coupled with the general
scarcity of capital during the world depression, foreign
direct investment via multinational corporations did not

play a significant role in the early Turkish economy.

Though the GOT liberalized its policies towards foreign di
rect investment in 1954, FDI remained limited by the gener

al sense of distrust and the requirement that 51 percent of

^From 1950 to 1980, the population increased from
19 m. to 45 m.
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the capital be held by Turkish nationals.® The bureau
cracy involved in approving the entry of foreign firms re
sulted in sizeable delays as the applications were shuffled
between the various ministries involved.

Tansky estimates

that foreign investment in 1956 amounted to about 3 percent
of total investment.9
It was not until 1963 that foreign capital began to

increase.

Ahmad calculated that during the period 1951-1961,

foreign capital invested in Turkey averaged T.L. 12.2 mil
lion a year, and that during 1962-1963 it had increased by

229 percent to T.L. 40.3 million.1® Foreign firms were
attracted to Turkey by the government's desire to industri
alize the Turkish economy and by the implementation of im

port substitution policies.

The large market and the in

creased desire for consumer goods attracted foreign firms

into the production of manufacturing goods such as elec
trical home appliances, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
automobiles.

It has been estimated that during the period

1951-1965, 95.28 percent of foreign capital invested in

Turkey was devoted to manufacturing, while 0.21 percent went

®Though the requirement that 51 percent be held by
Turkish nationals is not wrong, it has caused some problems

for MNCs as the capital shortage in Turkey made it diffi
cult to find local partners.

^Leo Tansky, US and USSR Aid to Developing Countries
(New York; Praeger, 1967), p.49.

lOAhmad (1977) p.279.

into agricutture,;2.34 percent into service industries, 1.25

percent into mining, and 0.92 percent into construction.H
Foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has
benefited from an ideal enviroriment.

That is , ; local inves

tors have provided the bulk of the capital; an abundant

supply of relatively cheap labor has been available| and
government protectionist measures have created monopoly
status for MNCs.

By investing in the manufacturing of final goods,
MNCs did little to contribute to the building of the infra-,

structure necessary for the industrialization of the Turkish
economy.

One point that needs to be elaborated on is the

claim that the local investors provided the bulk of the

capital.

Though at first sight this upholds the radical

school's position that the investment capital is generated
by local savings and that MNCs do not provide the scarce
financial resources, it cannot be viewed in these terms when

applied to the Turkish case.

Though Turkey does have a

capital shortage, the legislation in Turkey forbids MNCS

from owning more than 49 percent of the industry.

So while

lbid. Ahmad gives a further breakdown in the
manufacturing investments: 26% into plastics and rubber
industries, 25% into chemical industries, 13% into the

electrical industry, and 11%, into processed foods, alcoholic
beverages and tobacco.

l^Mumtaz Soysal, "The Policy of Mixed Industrial
Enterprises in Turkey and its Socio-Political Consequences",
Development and Change 1, no.2 (1969-1970): 25.
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the claim that the local investors provide the bulk of the

capital is true (51 percent), the terms of foreign invest

ment prevents this example as being used to compliment the
radical critic.

Critics of foreign investment also point to the fact
that because of its heavy orientation in the manufacturing

sector, large scale imports are required merely to keep the
industries operating, and because of their involvement in
the manufacturing of import substitutes the goods are not

geared for export.
come to be an issue.

In addition, capital flight has also
Hie has estimated that 74.8 percent

of the foreign investment which entered Turkey has been
repatriated in the form of profits.

Atilla Karaosman

oglu, an ex-World Bank bureaucrat, has found the figure to
be even higher.

According to his calculations, invest

ments by foreign companies totalled $112 million while the
sum repatriated amounted to $121 million.

In this regard,

foreign investment has not contributed a major capital stock
to the Turkish economy.

Foreign investment has also not contributed to

l%alter F. Weiker, The Modernization of

(New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers" 1981), p,211.
l^Ahmad (1977) p.298. His figures were estimated
up to 1970. Though these figures show that a greater
amount than the investments were repatriated, they are not

conclusive with regard to their overall, impact on the
balance of payments as they do not take into account that
portion of the profits reinvested in the country,
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Turkey's balance of payments account. The lack of foreign

exchangej which has been singled out as ohd of the inhibi- .
tive factors to achieving development in the LDCs, cannot,

however, solely be attributed to the operations of the MNCs.
In 1980, on the whole, Turkish industries' raw material

imports accounted for 77.2 percent of total imports, re
ducing the foreign exchange reserves of the country.
Furthermore, the lack of foreign exchange is also a direct

result of Turkey's^ attempt to industrialize in the shortest

possible time and trying to meet the optimistic industrial
growth rates projected by the SPO--which as Weiker points
out were politically rather than economically motivated.

This problem was further compounded by the high levels of
inefficiency on the part of the SEEs that failed to make
full use of the imported raw materials.
Turkish MNC critics also point to the fact that

foreign industries, because of the 'package investments in
ISihis figure was derived from those provided by the
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi's December 1981 Monthly Economic
Letter.

Because this figure includes that of the imports

of the foreign firms as well, and since separate figures
are not available for those firms with foreign shares (tech

nically all industries are considered Turkish as Turks hold
51% of the shares) it is impossible to derive the net effect
that MNCs have had on Turkey's balance of payments account.

One can conclude, however, that since MNCs account for 12,o

of gross sales in the manufacturing division, and due to
their limited involvement in other sectors, Turkish indus
tries (especially the SEEs) are responsible for the great
majority of the bill.

^^Weiker (1981) p.191.
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which they provide most everything from parts to marketing

techniques fail to make use of Turkey's subcontractors and
raw materials.

Furthermore, they point to studies that have

shown that foreign industries tend to be more capital inten
sive than their local counterparts, and that the technology

used in Turkey is the outmoded equipment of the developed
world, thereby preventing Turkey from competing with the
overseas industries.

It must also be pointed out that

industries with large shares of foreign capital, despite

being more capital intensive, employ an average of 458
workers, while the average number of workers employed by

Turkish private industries is 76 workers,

Weiker also

points out that Hie has found the productivity of foreign
firms much higher than the Turkish industries; while

providing work for 6.5 percent of the labor force, foreign
firms have accounted for 11.7 percent of the gross sales

in the manufacturing sector.18
Foreign enterprises have also been accused of not

complementing the country's development as a whole.

As

Soysal states, MHCs tend to concentrate in Western Turkey,
mainly Istanbul and Izmir rather than dispersing across the

coimtry.

While this critic is accurate, it cannot be limit-

l^Ibid. pp.211-213.
ISlbid.

In the late 1970s, it has been estimated

that foreign firms have provided 75,000 jobs.

ited to MNCs, local industries have also shown a strong

preference for Western Turkey.

According to a census con

ducted in 1964 by the State Institute of Statistics, in the

18 principal counties of Turkey, the number of plants has
increased from 632 to 2,444 during the period 1950-1963,
while in the remaining 49 counties the number of plants
increased from 80 to 331.

The reason for the preference

of Western Turkey is due to the fact that it is more devel

oped, has better communication systems, large ports, and
vertical and horizontal linkages between various industries.

Much of the Eastern region remains rural and has limited
accessibility.

According to Weiker, the radical right claims that

foreign investment has undermined Turkish nationalism and
that it has squeezed out many smaller industries, expecially
those in the Anatolian region.20

These accusations are,

however, debatable when one considers the fact that foreign
investment in Turkey has been rather small in absolute terms,

and as such, its ability to hinder the development of any

region remains highly questionable. By the same token the
amount of FBI also tends to negate the claim by the Turkish

left, that it is a tool of Neo-Colonialism. As previously
stated, to simply accuse the MNCs of hindering the devel

^^Soysal (1969-70) p.26. Industries' have clearly
shown a preference for the Thracian-Marmara-Aegean area.

Soysal has found that 45% of all manufacturing industries
are located in Istanbul and account for 48% of the total
net value added.

20weiker (1981) p.211.

r;; . V,

'V

■:

y^'"' ■ ■

:'^y.

y- :6oy ;'

optnent of the country as a whole is an over simplification
of a complex issuey ; Other factors need to be; taken
;
consideration in the analysis.

In ofder to assure an even regipnal deyelopmerit in

the industrialization of Turkey, SEEs were geographically

dispersed. The high rdtes of inefficiency and the astro- ,
nomical costs involved in their operations, due to their

seeming isolation from any linkage between other industries,
are some of the factors that have prevented - the regional

development of the country. ; In addition, Turkey's inability
to industrialize has also been attributed to its high

dependence on foreign countries for its intermediate mate
rials. This not only prevented Turkey from establishing
an infrastructure, but it also detracted from any impetus
to create one. Furthermore, it hindered its ability to

control prices as they were a function of the costs of imHence, despite the claims by the Turkish Ml-TC critics,

the impact of MNCs on the Turkish economy is far from con- ;
elusive.

As we have seen foreign investment has not had

a dominant role in the Turkish economy, and has mostly been

limited to the manufacturing sector. In comparison to its

Turkish counterparts, foreign industries have proven to be
more efficient and productive. As a result of the role of
local industries, it is difficult to determine the extent

of the impact, negative or positive, that MNCs have had on
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Turkey's economy. The claim that MNCs hinder the devel
opment of rural Turkey, is far too simplistic.
Like so many LDCs, Turkey's quest for rapid indus
trialization, was not only economically desxrable, but

politically imperative. The agricultural sector's ability
to absorb the labor surplus of a rapidly expanding popu
lation is clearly limited. This problem is further mag

nified since over 60 percent of Turkey's population is

rural. As such, an outlet for the growing labor force had
to be created.21 The industrialization of the country

appeared to be the solution; not only would it absorb the
increased labor force, but it was also concomitant with
Turkey's desire to move away from an agriculture economy.

The problem with this process was the urge to accomplish
it overnight. If one were to speculate, one could conclude
that it was the hopes of the GOT that establishing heavy
industries in the rural regions would generate further in

dustrial development. The meager transportation networks
in much of the rural area, along with the lack of satis

factory communication, electriGal., and water faqilities
proved to be strong deterrents to the founding of new
industries.

21with a rate of population growth of 2.5/o per _ annum,

it has been estimated that by the year 2000 Turk^ will
have a population of 60 million. The GQT will have to

play a significant role in reducing the growth rate.
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Under the notion of the mixed economy, the govern
ment was to invest in ventures that were necessary to create

a solid infrastructure.

As a means of developing the couhtry

the theoretical model of a mixed economy merits attentioh,

and could be implemented by Third World countries with sim

ilar barriers

to development.

One of the problems with the

mixed economy, however, is when the government begins to
view the model as a tool td advance its own interest, the

initial objectives become blurred and eventually lost.

It

must be recalled that Ataturk had viewed the mixed economy

as a means of promoting development while simultaneously

strengthening the private sector. The monopolizing of
various industries such as steel and oil, clearly deviates
22

from the goals of the mixed economy.

Because the SEEs

enjoye-d a monopoly and government subsidies, the goals of
productivity and efficiency, associated with most competi

^^The emergence of the armed forces as entrepreneurs
further violates the principles of the mixed economy.

In

January 1961, the passing of the Law of the Army Mutual
Assistance Association set up what soon became one of the

largest Gonglomerates in Turkey--the Ordu Yardimlasma
Kurumu (OYAK).

OYAK generates its capital by requiring

that all officers invest 10% of their saldry into the

conglomerate. This allowed the army to invest in the most
profitable branches of the economy. According to Ahmad,^
OYAK has gained controlling interests in Turkish Automotive
Industry; MAT (a truck and tractor sales firm); the OYAK
insurance cpmpany; has 42% of the shares of OYAK-Renault,
to name a few.

While OYAK began with a capital of about

$3.5 million, its 1972 assets were estimated at $300
million.

This clearly adds a new dimension to the polit

ical economy of the military coups.
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tive industries, were nonexistent.

This prevented the . ■

accumulation of capital, a.n absolute prerequisite for growth.

The loose management of the SEEs is not the sole reason for

poor performance. A great portion of the costs stem from
the SEEs location in rural areas devoted to agriculture, and

lacking in regional comparative advantage for the develop
ment of industries.23

it could be argued that if Turkey is

to achieve equitable development it must concentrate ou the

particular regions'natural comparative advantage, Develop
ment, it must be realized, is not limited to industrializa
tion, but encompasses other sectors such as agriculture,

rearing of livestock, and forestry as well. This does not

imply that Turkey should ignore its industrial capabilities,
but that it should be more selective in its locations; and
in areas not conducive to industries, the development of
alternative sectors should be explored.
The Role of M^JCs Under The

New Economic Policies :

The Turkish government is presently seeking foreign

23The term 'regional comparative advantage' follows

the same principal as the Ricardian model, but is used in
reference to the domestic rather than the international
level. ■ ■ . ■ .
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investments in the agroindustrial sector.24 The GOT aims
at combining the processing facilities with contract farming
with the rural population.

The export of poultry, fruits,

vegetables, beef and mutton to the Arabian Peninsula is
being heavily encouraged.

This, however, requires more

elaborate processing and packaging operations than presently
available, and the foreign firms are expected to play a

vital role in providing capital and expertise.

The com

bining of contract farming with foreign industries involved
in the processing and packaging of the goods, while bene

fiting the economy also avoids the displacing of the rural
population common with large scale agroindustrial projects.
Foreign investment is also allov7ed in cattle raising and
integrated animal husbandry.

This is an attempt by the GOT.

to improve on the breeds and to take advantage of an un
exploited market.

While having increased the emphasis in the agri
cultural sector, the GOT is continuing its attention to the

manufacturing, oil, and mining sectors.

In these areas,

MNCs are encouraged to participate in joint ventures with
Turkish industries.

Foreign private investment in these

fields is attractive to the Turkish government as, in

24The term 'agroindustry' follows Austin's defi
nition in which he describes it as; "an enterprise that

processes agricultural raw materials including ground and
tree crops as well as livestock". This involves the entire
process from seed or pasture to the consumer.

addition to providing expertise and capital, it shares the
risks and costs.

With the MNCs providing a share of the

capital, the burden on the national debt is eased as the
government would otherwise be compelled to borrow the nec
essary funds.

As an incentive for oil exploration, the GOT

has lifted the artificially set price of $5.21 a barrel and

has brought it closer to that of the world level.
tion, 35 percent of any find may be exported.

In addi

Further

incentives in the like of tax rebates, tax holidays, custom

exemption for material required for investment, are used as
a means of enticing foreign investment.

The only sector in which Turkey allows foreign
investors to hold 100 percent of the investment is in tour

ism, provided that they construct hotels with a minimum
capacity of 400 beds; or in the case of yacht tourism, a
minimum of 60 beds.

Despite having 8,370 kilometers of

Mediterranean coastline scattered with the relics of

ancient civilization, Turkey's tourist industry has left
much to be desired.

of accomodations.

beds was 47,000.25

Part of this is attributed to the lack

At the end of 1979, the number of hotel

While the Turkish government is investing

in new roads and an international airport at Dalaman, in

south-west Turkey, they are counting on foreign investors

25The Economist 12, 18 September, 1981.

For a basis

of comparison: Greece's total was 266,000, and Spain's
977,000.

^
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to build facilities that would meet the rich European stan

dards and tastes.

The potential of the tourist industry is

highlighted by the fact that foreign investors are allowed
to own the entire operation.

As can be seen, Turkey is a prime example of a

country able to attract foreign investment on its own
terms.26

in the past, Turkey has attempted to develop a

strong private economy, but was hampered by the scarcity of
capital and the lack of technological resources. The present

policies are an attempt to overcome these barriers without
compromising the country's quest for development or its
sovereignty over the national economy.

The increased MNG

competition should prove advantageous for Turkey's foreign
investment.

While the Turkish radical left claims that if

the economic benefits are weighed in favor of Turkey,foreign
firms would, under these conditions never agree to enter;

the investment of $100 million on the part of foreign firms

in the eighteen months following the reforms along with the
increase in applications for entry tend to negate this claim
26i5^ the eighteen months following the reforms Turkey
has had a net new foreign investment of $100 million.

Though at first sight this does not appear to be a sub-_
stantial amount, when compared to previous investments it
is rather sizeable.

Furthermore, in light of the economic

and political condition that Turkey was in, this sum takes
on greater significance and coupled with the increase in
applications for entry, marks,in my opinion, the future trend
of foreign investment.
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and supports the contention that MNCs will opt to forsake

a portion of their profits rather than the entire market.
Also, the higher rates of productivity and efficiency

asso

ciated with fpreigh firms, along with their eapital and
their expertise makes them attraetive to Turkey's attempt

to strengthen its economy.

This in turn, dictates that the

MNCs be assured economic benefits so as to continue invest

ments in the couhtry.

For the most part the incentives that

are offered foreign firms are indicative of their potential
contribution to the country, and the extent of the MNC

competition in that particular field.
trated in the Turkish case.

This is well illus

This quid pro quo relationship

between MNCs and Turkey could prove to be the foundation of

the growth and, provided its correct application, the even
tual development of the country.

1 Summary and Conclusion

Foreign direct investment has not had a substantial
role in the development of the Turkish economy.

This is,

in part, due to the fact that Turkey sought to be selfsufficient and independent of foreign investors.

The lack ;

of capital, managerial and technological skills prompted
Turkey to liberalize its policies towards MNCs in 1954.
However, up to 1980, the distrust of foreigners prevailed,
and entry by MNCs remained limited.

It was not until the

new economic policies of January 1980 that the GOT began to

actively court foreign enterprises.

Given the recentness

of these policfes,,: ttie impact of MNCs cannot be determined
as-;of yet^V;,

V
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The specific entry fequirements as forwarded by the

GOT along with the increase in applications for entry rights

suggest that Turkey will be able to take advantage of the
benefits assbciated with FDI while maintaining strict control
over its ecbnomic development plans•

Chapter 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As the review of literature has shown, the conclu

sions on the impact of multinational corporations on the

developing world are far from copgehial. Though the theoret
ical approach of the Neo-Classical school is conducive to

growth, its application has failed to meet the theoretical
objectives. It is therefore importarit to look, at the alter
native schools in an attempt to evaluate the performance of
the orthodox model, and to objectively analyze the reasons

for which the full implementatioh of the■Neb-Classical model
has not met with expectations.

This task is simplified when

the alternative schools are viewed as resulting from the

dissatisfaction with the application of the orthodox model,

and as forwarding their respective analyses and conclusions.
The major limitation to these approaches is the aggregate

analysis of the impact of Mtrcs which tends to ignore the
specific circumstances surrounding the host country, as v^ell
as its particular relationships with the MNCs within its
borders.

As such, any single approach cannot be used as a

blanket analysis of the impact of MNCs in a particular coun

try.

The impact of each MNC on a host country must be

analyzed on an individual basis.
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It appears as axiomatic that the development of a
country must be based on a solid infrastructure conducive
to the continued growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Without a solid foundation and increases in the GDP concom

itant with the increase in population, development will

remain a distant goal.

Though economic growth is not a

sufficient factor to ensure development, it is an absolute

prerequisite. Prior to the 1980 reforms, Turkey applied
cosmetic remedies in its quest for development.

That is,

it encouraged the process of industrialization through im

port substitution, thereby giving the appearance of modern
ization, but without achieving development.

During this

process the development of a Solid foundation was largely
neglected.

The new policies are an attempt to overcome

some of the past problems.

The principal job of the public

sector will be to concentrate on its original role of

developing an infrastructure. Specifically, the focus will
be on ehergy, transport, irrigation, and agricultural in
vestments.

A notion which Turkey has also come to reevaluate
is that of self-sufficiency as a means of eliminating any

reliance on foreign countries.

This orientation has been,

it can be argued, based on false premises.

That is, the

assumption that self-sufficiency implies a total indepen
dence from outside forces, and the ability to locally

produce all of the country's needs. The integration of the

world market has been generated by the impossibility of such

a task which presupposes the availability and abundance of
all resources.

Rather, it must be argued, that self-

sufficiency should signify a country's ability to pursue its

quesb for development by relying bhitao^f^

of pro

duction for integration in the world market.

With regard to MNCs being agents of development, the

following argument should be considered. The term develop
ment has been too losely used and often interchangeably with

growth. This has resulted with many LDCs being satisfied
with an increase in the growth rates, while neglecting the
more involved and complicated process of development. Along
the same line, there have been debates over whether multi
national corporations are agents of deve1opment. It seems

evident that they are not, nor can they be agents of devel

opment. Development is neither within the objectives or
the abilities of MNCs. Their role in the economic development
of the Third World can only be limited to agents of growth.
MNCs can contribute to the host country's develop

ment plans by providing capital and expertise--managerial
and technological--as well as through the inter-corporate
links.

Their accessibility to the world market is a great

asset in promoting exports and adding to the host country's
foreign exchange reserves. Of course, this is not always
the case, but it is the responsibility of the host govern
ment to assure MNC compliance.

The current inter-MNC

11

competition along with the LDCs' better understanding of
the operation of MNCs will lead to this end.
It must be recalled that this study assumed that the

host government has the best interesf of the country in mind.
As such, this study did not focus on possible cpllusion

between the governing elite and the MNCs.

This thesis mere

ly sought to see whether a host country, whose government

is responsive to its constituents, can effectively use MNCs
as a means to enhance development efforts.

In their attempts to harness the MNCs, many host

countries have implemented various means of control.

One

of the most common has been the requirement of joint venture-

ships. To assume, however, that varying proportions of
ownership assures control over the MNCs, tends to overlook
the modus operandi of MNCs, and further assumes that they

will be drastically altered according to ownership and

nationality.

Given the recent trend that MNCs are unlikely

to impose self-restraint on the basis of national loyalty,
joint ownership as a means of control may be ineffective.
Studies have found that in joint ventures local investors

frequently place more emphasis on declaring dividends and
less on the reinvestment of earnings. As a result, though

foreign investors are less successful in deferring tax

pajnnents, it does not appear that the amount of repatriated
profits are drastically affected by joint ventures. As this
study has argued, it will be the new found power of selectivity
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which will allow the host countries to assure that the oper

ation of MNCs is compleiuentary to their overall development

plans.

The recent rise in European and Third World multi

national corporations marks the heginning of a new^e

in

international trade, and is part of the dialectical process

leading to a better and more equitable world.
With regards to the question of whether MNCs are a
mean of enhancing Turkey's development, a conclusive answer
cannot be made at this time.

This is mainly the result of

the limited involvement of MNCs in Turkey.

While MNCs have

negatively affected certain aspects of the Turkish economy,
they have benefited others.

In the long run, the increase in MNC competition

along with the LDCs' better understanding of the operation
Of MNCs should allow host govemments to capture a larger
share of the benefits in their dealings with MI^Cs , the prop

er use of which would greatly facilitate the task pf

economic development.

Rather than being viewed as s threat,

MNCs will hopefully serve as a bridge between the developed
and the less developed worlds.
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Appendix B

Hacroeconomic

Targets and Acliievements of the Development

Plans.

1st
Plan

1963

Target

ActuaT

2nd
Plan

1968

3rd:

1972

Plan

1973
1977

Target

Actual

Target

:

Sectoral■Growth Rates

Industry
Services
GDP
GNP

Fixed

4.2
12.3

6.2

3.7
10.6

,

7.5

6.9
7.0

6.5
6.7

3.6
9.9

4.1
12.0
6.3
6.6
7.0

3.7

11.4

7.7
6.6
7.1

6.8

15.2

11.1

3.7

3.3
26.8
9.0
16.0
2.1
20.1
4.7

11.7
5.8

7.6
7.4

3.3
9.9
7.9
6.5
6.5

Investment

Sectoral Distribution
17.7
5.4
Mining
16.9
Manufac turing
8.6
13.7
1.4
Tourism
20.3
Housing
7.1
Education
2.3
Health
6.6
Other Services

13.9
5.6
20.4
6.5

Total

31.1

11.8
3.7
28.2
7.4
20.6
1.0
16.9
3.3
1.1
6.0

100.0

1.3

22.4
8.0
16.1
2.3

22.4

17.9

6.6
1.8
5.9

1.8

1.4

5.9

5.4

8.5
14.5
1.6
15.7
5.0
1.4
4.7

lOUTU

lOOTO

10770

10077

10777

59 .9
40.1

53.6
46.4

52.6
: 47.4

52.9
47.1

56.4
43.6

51.1
48.9

100.0

1^^

lUoTO

lUOTO

10770

10777

18.3

15.3

21.3

17. 8

23.4

20.2

12. 3
5.5

8.9
4.8

10.4
6.2

6.6

"577

"O"

15.6

6.7

:

Ownership (7
Public
Private

Total

As 7o of GNP

(average in Plan period)

Consumption Growth {%
Public
Private

Total

8 .7

7.7

5.4

; 4.8

8.8
5.1

TTT

"57T

"57?

84

Appendix B

1st
Plan

19631967

2nd
Plan

19681972

3rd
Plan

1973
1977

Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual

National Savings
Annual Growth

/

(%)

13.4

16.2

As 7o of GNP

14.8 _

15.7

12.2
20.8

^

9.1
18.3

13.6
21.9

6.3
19.9

(average in Plan period)

Source: Weiker p.185; As cited in TUSIDA, "The Turkish Econ
omy", p.101.
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Appendix G

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1923

Izmir Econmic Conference establishes that

the principal economic goal of the coxintty
would be the industrialization of the
economy.

1929

World depression brings an end to the res

trictive provisions in the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne.

Signed between the Turkish

government and the Allied Powers, the treaty,
among other stipulations required that the
GOT not impose higher tariffs than those
effective in 1916.

This clause had hampered

Turkey to protect its infant industries from
foreign competition.
1930

Turkey reappraises its economic policies, and
emerges with a new economic model--a mixed
economy.

1946

The founding of the Democratic Party (DP)
marks the end of the monoparty system

established by Ataturk.

Turkey accepts US foreign aid under the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. ^ As
it marks the beginning of Turko-US alliance
it also constitutes a basic theoretical

shift in Turkey's approach to etatism-

the policy of state enterprise and control.
1954

January 18, the Law for the Encouragement

of Foreign Capital is enacted. Though the
law was geared towards attracting FDI, the ; ;
distrust of foreigners by government offi
cials prevented the full implementation of
the laws liberal policies.
1960

The military overthrows the DP headed by_
Adnan Menderes on May 27, due to the admin
istrations failure to preserve Kemalist

The State Planning Organization (SPG) is
created, marking the imp1ementation of eco
nomic planning. The economic targets were
made on a five year plan basis. They are
now in the fourth.
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1-961

■In January, the passing of the Law of the
Army Mutual Assistance Association set up
what was to become one of Turkey's largest

conglomerates--the Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu
<OYAK)

1961-62

1971

A new constitution is approved by refe
rendum, providing a strong executive.

Following prolonged political and economic
unrest, the armed forces demand the
resignation of Demirel.

1950-77

Turkey experiences an average annual growth
rate of 6.5%, the highest among the OECD

countries. Real growth, however, is dimi
nished by an annual population growth rate
of

1977

2.5%.

Following a defeat in a vote of confidence,
Ecevit is replaced by Demirel. A total of
262 people die in continuous political
violence.

Serious economic problems are

manifested.
1978

The death toll from the recurrent political
violence reaches nearly 290 by early August,

surpassing the total of 1977.
1980

The Justice Party headed by Demirel returns

to power following Ecevit's resignation in

November.

The Justice Party inherits a

nearly bankrupt economy.

Turkey is unable

to service its foreign debts, inflation nears
120%, the money supply increased by 150%
in less than two yeats, and unemplojnuent
reaches 25%.

January 24, Turkey adopts a new outwardoriented economic policy.

January 25, Decree No. 8/168 amends the Law
for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital and
further liberalizes it.

September 12, as a result of social unrest
and political violence the military takes
over the reigns of government. Turgut Ozal,
the author of the new economic program is

promoted to the post of deputy prime minister
for economic affairs.
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1981

Eighteen months after the implementation
of the economic reforms inflation is

reduced from a high of 1337o to under
35%. After 3 years of zero or negative

growth, Turkey records a growth rate of
4.47o for the year.

1982

Turkey continues its economic recovery.
Its successes over the past 2 years,
surprises even the IMF.

